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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his classic novel, Animal Farm, George Orwell wrote, “All animals 
are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”1  Orwell’s Animal 
Farm offers insight on the human tendency to create a class system within an 
alleged equal and classless system.  Such is the U.S. Department of 
Corrections.  In a system where all prisoners are equal, some prisoners are 
more equal than others.   
How many transgender persons are currently living in the United 
States?  The simple answer: no one is quite sure.2  Based on what limited data 
is available, the National Center for Transgender Equality asserts that 
between 0.25% and 1% of the U.S. population is transsexual.3  Scholars in 
transgender studies estimate that 1 in 30,000 adult males seek sex 
reassignment surgery.4  This Article will explore a controversial holding of a 
U.S. District Court regarding transgender prisoner rights.  Issues such as 
transgender rights are no longer stifled by the law, but rather are finally being 
heard.   
In Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts ordered an injunction for sex reassignment surgery for the 
very first time.5  Michelle Kosilek, a transgender inmate with severe gender 
identity disorder (GID), initially brought suit in Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek 
I) seeking hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery.6  In Kosilek I, his 
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claim was denied based on an inability to meet every element of his Eighth 
Amendment claim.7  Kosilek was successful in Kosilek II, but the legal 
implications of the District Court’s order are still unclear.   
This Note will argue that Kosilek II opens the door for transgender 
prisoner rights because the U.S. District Court correctly took such a strong, 
although limited, stance on sex reassignment surgery for transgender 
prisoners.  Section II explores prior transgender prisoner litigation; 
particularly Kosilek I.  Section III discusses the facts and findings of the 
District Court in Kosilek v. Spencer.  Finally, Section IV will analyze three 
controversial aspects of this case by predicting the future implications of this 
controversial holding on upcoming transgender prisoner litigation, 
considering the Department of Correction’s oppressive policies, and 
evaluating whether such a holding is a reasonable use of taxpayer dollars. 
Due to the severity of Kosilek’s gender identity disorder and the need for 
social reform, the District Court came to the appropriate conclusion in 
Kosilek v. Spencer. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Until recently, issues regarding transgender rights were dodged by both 
circuit and district courts.  Given that law-abiding transgender rights were 
not considered, transgender prisoner rights certainly were not making their 
way through the judicial system.  In Farmer v. Brennan, the U.S. Supreme 
Court heard a transgender prisoner rights case for the first time.8  The Court 
described a transsexual as a person who has ‘“[a] rare psychiatric disorder in 
which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical 
sex,’ and who typically seeks medical treatment, including hormone therapy 
and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change.”9  Prisoner treatment 
and prison conditions, including treatment of transsexual persons, are subject 
to evaluation under the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.10  Farmer further laid out the standard for injunctive relief for 
evaluating such treatment,  which the district court later applied in Kosilek I 
and II.11  In considering injunctive relief, courts must consider the “attitudes 
and conduct” of prison staff at the time of the litigation and make inferences 
into their attitudes once the suit has commenced.12 
To fully understand the holding of Kosilek II, an in depth analysis of 
Kosilek I is necessary.  For purposes of this Article, Kosilek will be referred 
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to as “he,” consistent with the district court opinion.13  In Kosilek I,  Kosilek 
brought suit against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) 
Commissioner, Maloney, regarding deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need and inadequate medical care, but his claim was ultimately 
dismissed by the district court.14  However, in dicta, the Kosilek I court made 
many important statements that came to light in Kosilek II.15   
In Kosilek I, Plaintiff Michelle Kosilek brought his first claim alleging 
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need and inadequate medical 
care from the DOC.16  Kosilek is currently serving a life sentence for the 
murder of his wife.17  Kosilek suffers from GID, which causes him extreme 
mental anguish, as he feels that he is a woman “cruelly trapped” in a man’s 
body.18  
Kosilek’s mother abandoned him at an orphanage at the age of three, 
where he was often reprimanded and punished for wearing female clothing.19  
He was later reunited with his mother but was then frequently raped by his 
grandfather.20  When Kosilek expressed a longing to live life as a female, his 
stepfather stabbed him.21  In response to these horrors, Kosilek fled home and 
took on a female persona, soon falling into a life of drugs and prostitution.22  
For roughly a year, Kosilek received illegal prescription estrogen hormone 
treatments in exchange for sex.23  After getting his college degree, Kosilek 
relapsed back into drug use, and sought treatment at a rehabilitation facility.24  
During his stint in rehab, Kosilek met Cheryl McCaul, a volunteer 
counselor.25  McCaul advised Kosilek that his transsexualism “would be 
cured by a good woman,” and the two got married.26  Kosilek murdered 
McCaul in 1990.27  At his trial, Kosilek claimed self-defense because McCaul 
poured boiling tea on his genitals.28 
While awaiting trial, Kosilek took birth control pills that were illegally 
provided to him by a prison guard.29  During that time, Kosilek attempted 
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suicide twice, and he once tried to castrate himself.30  Upon his conviction, 
Kosilek went to the DOC to serve his sentence of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.31 
While incarcerated, Kosilek met with many psychologists, most of 
whom had no background with gender identity disorder patients.32  However, 
the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) 
created the Standards of Care, which exists to “provide clinical guidance for 
health professionals to assist transsexual, transgender, and gender 
nonconforming people with safe and effective pathways to achieving lasting 
personal comfort with their gendered selves, in order to maximize their 
overall health, psychological well-being, and self-fulfillment.”33 
As explained by the court, “The Standards of Care establish a ‘triadic 
treatment sequence.’ This triadic sequence is comprised of: (1) hormone 
therapy; (2) a real-life experience of living as a member of the opposite sex; 
and (3) sex reassignment surgery.”34  The Standards of Care promote the use 
of hormone therapy as a way to improve quality of life and diminish 
depression and suicidal thoughts in those that suffer from GID.35 
The Standards of Care expressly address hormone therapy for 
incarcerated inmates.36  It provides that inmates who were previously 
prescribed hormone therapy for GID should continue to receive that 
treatment during their incarceration.37  The Standards of Care also 
specifically address sex reassignment surgery, providing that sex 
reassignment surgery is, in some cases, “medically indicated and medically 
necessary” and “constitutes a very effective and appropriate treatment for 
transsexualism or profound GID.”38 
Kosilek demanded treatment for his severe GID from the DOC, and he 
consistently claimed that he would commit suicide if treatment was not 
provided to him.39  Given these threats and Kosilek’s history, the court 
concluded that Kosilek did indeed have a serious medical disorder and was 
suffering from extreme emotional distress.40 
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In 2000, DOC Commissioner Maloney, a defendant in the initial suit, 
adopted a freezing policy regarding the treatment of transgender prisoners in 
the DOC.41  This policy froze transsexual prisoners by only providing 
hormone therapy to prisoners for whom it was prescribed prior to 
incarceration.42  Since Kosilek never had a valid prescription for hormones, 
this policy made it impossible for Kosilek to receive hormone therapy.43  
In meetings regarding Kosilek, Maloney frequently expressed his 
opinion that sex reassignment surgery or hormone therapy was not an 
appropriate use of taxpayer dollars.44   Further, Maloney expressed security 
concerns, particularly because Kosilek’s facility had a high number of sex 
offenders.45  DOC doctors indicated that a medical decision was not made, 
but rather an administrative decision was made, which banned treatment for 
transgender prisoners.46 
In response to Kosilek’s complaint, Maloney moved to dismiss all 
claims against him.47  The court partially granted this motion but denied one 
claim.48  As a result, the only claim considered in Kosilek I was whether 
Kosilek was entitled to injunctive relief due to Maloney’s violation of 
Kosilek’s rights under the Eighth Amendment.49 
The Eighth Amendment bans the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishment and prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on 
an inmate.50  Prison officials have a duty to ensure that inmates have access 
to adequate medical care.51  To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a 
plaintiff prisoner must establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical 
need that violates “evolving standards of decency.”52 
To have a valid claim for deliberate indifference, both a subjective and 
an objective component must be met.53  To meet the objective prong, the 
prisoner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he has a serious 
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medical need that has not been adequately treated.54  A serious medical need 
may be found in one of two ways: diagnosis by a licensed physician or a 
medical need that is so obvious that an average person would know it needs 
the attention of a physician.55  Further, the Eighth Amendment requires that 
these medical decisions be considered on a case-by-case basis rather than by 
general prison policy.56 
In rendering judgments regarding the medical care provided to inmates, 
the court must base its decisions on medical considerations.57  Also relevant 
to deliberate indifference claims are “the realities of prison administration.”58  
These realities include guaranteeing safety of both inmates and prison staff.59  
However, these security concerns must be legitimate and justified, and 
“concern for controversy is not a constitutionally permissible basis for 
denying an inmate necessary medical care.”60 
In applying these standards, the district court noted that Kosilek needed 
to prove four elements to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim: “(1) he 
had a serious medical need; (2) which had not been adequately treated; (3) 
because of Maloney's deliberate indifference; and (4) that deliberate 
indifference was likely to continue in the future.”61  
First, the court found that Kosilek did have a serious medical need.62  
Neither party disputed Kosilek’s GID.63  However, GID alone is not enough 
to establish a serious medical need, so the court considered Kosilek’s history 
of depression, suicide attempts, and extreme mental anguish in finding that 
he had a serious medical need.64  In light of Kosilek’s history, the court found 
that Kosilek had a serious medical need.65 
Next, the court held that Kosilek was not given adequate medical 
treatment.66  Although some therapy and counseling was offered to Kosilek, 
the court noted that physicians specializing in GID issues never examined 
Kosilek to determine what treatment was necessary to treat his severe GID.67  
Further, the DOC policy and guidelines precluded the possibility that Kosilek 
could ever receive hormone therapy because they banned certain types of 
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treatments that Kosilek would have greatly benefitted from, including sex 
reassignment surgery.68  The court decided that counseling alone was not 
enough given the severity of Kosilek’s condition, and therefore, Kosilek was 
denied adequate medical treatment.69  The court found, due to the DOC’s 
freezing policy, that Kosilek never had an appropriate medical evaluation 
while incarcerated in the DOC, thus rendering the undisputed treatment of 
his serious medical need inadequate.70 
Although Kosilek met the first two elements of his cruel and unusual 
punishment claim, the latter two elements were not met.71  The court 
determined that commissioner Maloney did not act with deliberate 
indifference toward Kosilek for a variety of reasons.72  In its reasoning, the 
court noted that Maloney’s actions were “rooted in sincere security concerns 
. . . in a fear of public and political criticism[,] . . . [and] concern[] that any 
expenditure for hormones or sex reassignment surgery might be an 
inappropriate use of taxpayers’ money.”73  Additionally, and importantly, 
Maloney was not a medical professional, but his lack of understanding about 
the medical needs of Kosilek was acceptable to the court.74 
The court believed that Maloney would not continue to be indifferent 
to the medical needs of Kosilek.75  “The court expects that, educated by the 
trial record and this decision, Maloney and his colleagues will in the future 
attempt to discharge properly their constitutional duties to Kosilek.”76  
Further, the court noted that its decision put Maloney on notice of issues with 
transgender inmates and instructed how to handle those inmates in the 
future.77   
Kosilek also raised concern about the freezing policy of the DOC, but 
the court said that the policy was sufficient.78  However, “decisions as to 
whether psychotherapy, hormones, and/or sex reassignment surgery are 
necessary to treat Kosilek adequately must be based on an ‘individualized 
medical evaluation’ of Kosilek rather than as ‘a result of a blanket rule.’”79 
Although the court entered a judgment for Maloney, the court made 
many statements that shed light on its policy opinions.80  First, the court noted 
that Kosilek should receive counseling from someone trained and well-
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versed in dealing with GID patients, rather than doctors who have never 
encountered GID.81  Second, if psychotherapy is not enough, the court 
encouraged treatment by pharmaceutical therapy.82  Further, the court 
acknowledged that these considerations may be trumped by the DOC’s 
concerns for safety, if properly pled.83  However, the court noted that Kosilek 
already lived as a female in a male prison population, and thus far it had 
posed no security issues.84  Although a judgment was entered for Maloney, 
the district court soon heard again from Michelle Kosilek.85 
III.  EXPOSITION OF THE CASE 
Unfortunately, the DOC did not cooperate with Kosilek as the court had 
wished in 2002.86  In Kosilek v. Spencer, Kosilek proved the DOC violated 
his rights under the Eighth Amendment.87  Where Kosilek I dealt specifically 
with hormone therapy, Kosilek II sought “an unprecedented court order 
requiring that the defendant Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department 
of Correction (the ‘DOC’) provide him with sex reassignment surgery to treat 
his major mental illness, severe gender identity disorder.”88  While the issue 
of sex reassignment surgery and prisoner’s rights had come before the court 
prior to Kosilek I, this case differed significantly in that a DOC physician 
prescribed sex reassignment surgery to Kosilek as the only means of treating 
his illness.89  
Notably, the court provided information on the aftermath of Kosilek I.90  
Kosilek I was decided in August 2002, and by December 2002, the DOC 
made significant changes to its freezing policy.91  Previously, the DOC’s 
policy was to provide hormones to transgender inmates only if they had been 
prescribed such prior to incarceration, but the new policy allowed for flexible 
increases or decreases on a case-by-case basis.92  However, the 
Commissioner and the Director of the Department’s Health Services 
Division must approve any changes in prescriptions.93 
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90.  Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 218. 
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In 2003, a GID specialist, Dr. David Seil, evaluated Kosilek.94  As a 
result of his evaluation, Dr. Seil prescribed Kosilek estrogen therapy.95 
Regarding sex reassignment surgery, Dr. Seil recommended Kosilek be 
treated with hormones for one year, and if they proved insufficient, then sex 
reassignment would be necessary to treat Kosilek.96  In response to this future 
recommendation, Maloney terminated Dr. Seil’s employment with the 
DOC.97  However, Maloney and the DOC did provide Kosilek with estrogen 
treatments beginning in August 2003, and Kosilek was allowed to wear 
female undergarments.98  Then, in 2003, Kathleen Dennehy became the 
commissioner of the DOC, and she was “determined not to be the first prison 
official in the United States to authorize sex reassignment surgery for an 
inmate.”99 
In September 2004, Kosilek was to be evaluated for sex reassignment 
surgery by a specialist from Fenway Community Health Center of 
Massachusetts, a leading clinic in GID.100  Fearing a prescription of sex 
reassignment surgery, Dennehy took an “unprecedented step” and had the 
DOC find a specialist of its own to evaluate Kosilek.101   
Given that some Fenway doctors were still in the process of providing 
treatment to Kosilek, Fenway doctors continued to meet with Kosilek.102  In 
a report from the Fenway doctors to the DOC, the doctors advised Dennehy 
that Kosilek needed sex reassignment surgery and that if Kosilek did not 
receive surgery, he was at a very high risk of suicide or self-harm.1036  In 
response, the DOC hired Dr. Osborne, a heavily influenced colleague of a 
former Vatican physician who was known for his view that sex reassignment 
surgery is “religiously abhorrent.”104  The court found that the DOC hired 
Osborne because it was foreseeable Osborne would deny sex reassignment 
surgery given her Vatican background.105   
Additionally, Dennehy continued to claim she did not know if Fenway 
doctors recommended sex reassignment surgery.106  Dennehy still feigned 
confusion despite the fact that she wrote a note to the Director of the Bureau 
of Prisons, writing, “[o]ur medical providers[,] the Commonwealth’s medical 
school, is supporting their consultant’s recommendation for the 
                                                                                                                           
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. at 219. 
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99.  Id. at 220. 
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104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 222. 
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surgery!!!!!!”107  Clearly, she was aware of the recommendation.108  For these 
reasons, the court found that Dennehy knew that sex reassignment surgery 
was the only available option to treat Kosilek’s severe GID.109 
To obtain an injunction ordering sex reassignment surgery, Kosilek had 
to prove the following,  
(1) he ha[d] a serious medical need; (2) sex reassignment surgery was the 
only adequate treatment for it; (3) the defendant [knew] that Kosilek was at 
high risk of serious harm if he [did] not receive sex reassignment surgery; 
(4) the defendant ha[d] not denied that treatment because of good faith, 
reasonable security concerns or for any other legitimate penological 
purpose; and (5) the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct [would] continue 
in the future.110 
Since Kosilek I, DOC doctors deemed sex reassignment surgery the 
only adequate option to treat Kosilek, and a DOC specialist prescribed 
Kosilek with sex reassignment surgery.111  In response to that 
recommendation, DOC deputy commissioner Kathleen Dennehy participated 
in efforts to have the specialist fired.112  Dennehy then became commissioner 
of the DOC, and she failed to provide transgender inmates with prescription 
hormone therapy.113 The DOC then hired Dr. Cynthia Osborne.114  Osborne 
previously worked in the Johns Hopkins psychiatric department, which is 
known for its strong views opposing sex reassignment surgery, believing that 
no prisoner should ever need sex reassignment surgery.115  Osborne had 
previously evaluated transgender prisoners and always found that sex 
reassignment surgery was not necessary.116  Dennehy claimed that the DOC 
did not hire Osborne because of her anti-sex reassignment surgery stance, 
which the Court found to be a blatant lie.117 
Kosilek, at the time of this Article, receives counseling and hormone 
therapy.118  Dennehy indicated in 2006 that she was aware of the seriousness 
of Kosilek’s medical condition, admitting she was on notice that sex 
reassignment surgery may be the only adequate treatment for Kosilek.119  
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111.  Id. at 197. 
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113.  Id. at 202. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. 
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Despite this knowledge, Dennehy indicated that “providing such treatment 
would create insurmountable security problems[,]” and therefore, treatment 
was denied for security reasons.120  Despite the alleged security concerns, 
Dennehy did admit that Kosilek’s safety could be “reasonably assured” post-
sex reassignment surgery.121  
In response, Kosilek suggested that security concerns merely cloaked 
the true reason the DOC denied sex reassignment surgery, claiming they were 
swayed by “a fear of controversy, criticism, ridicule, and scorn.”122  The 
district court agreed and found the denial to be an Eighth Amendment 
violation.123  While the court considered the fear of controversy was 
understandable given the circumstances, the court held that such a fear does 
not trump a prisoner’s right to be free from deliberate indifference under the 
Eighth Amendment.124  The court held that denial of adequate medical care 
for political reasons is “precisely the type of conduct the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits.”125  Due to the political and controversial aspects of the case, the 
court concluded that the DOC would continue to violate Kosilek’s rights 
unless judicial action was taken.126 
In light of these facts, the court ordered an injunction commanding the 
DOC to provide Kosilek with the prescribed treatment of sex reassignment 
surgery.127  In its reasoning, the court noted that GID should be treated just 
as any other mental illness is treated.128  The applicable standards in this case 
were precisely the same as in Kosilek I.  Like Kosilek I, the court found that 
Kosilek’s GID was an undisputed fact.129  However, the court had to 
determine the “current” severity of Kosilek’s GID.130  The Court referred 
back to the detailed facts surrounding Kosilek I,131 as explored in the previous 
Section.  In evaluating Kosilek’s current level of distress, the court found that 
Kosilek’s risk of suicide or self-harm would significantly increase from an 
already high level if sex reassignment surgery was denied.132 
The court next determined that sex reassignment surgery was the only 
adequate treatment for Kosilek’s severe GID.133  In considering the Standards 
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of Care from Kosilek I,134 the court found that it had been well established by 
the record that sex reassignment surgery is the only adequate treatment for 
Kosilek, satisfying the objective element of the deliberate indifference test.135 
Kosilek also satisfied the third element of his burden, proving the 
subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test.136 To meet this burden, 
Kosilek needed to prove that prison officials knew of and disregarded his 
serious medical need.137 The court found that the record “clearly 
establishe[d]” that DOC officials knew of the substantial risk of harm if 
Kosilek was not adequately treated, given his previous attempts at suicide 
and castration.138 
Lastly, the court determined that the deliberate indifference of the DOC 
would continue.139  In determining this, the court considered all of the 
inappropriate actions and decisions on the part of the DOC aimed directly at 
Kosilek and other transgender prisoners.140  Since all four elements (as listed 
in the previous Section) were met, the court issued a rare and limited 
injunction.141  The court noted that it would not decide where and who would 
perform the surgery, nor would it determine where and how Kosilek would 
be incarcerated post-surgery.142  Kosilek has yet to receive sex reassignment 
surgery, as this decision is currently on appeal.143  Kosilek has, however, 
received laser hair removal and continues to receive hormone therapy.144 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Issues surrounding transgender prisoner rights may seem few and far 
between.  While it is unclear exactly how many transgender persons are 
currently incarcerated, studies show that transgender persons suffering from 
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GID are more likely to end up in prison than average citizens.145  According 
to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force and the National Center for 
Transgender Equality,  
[Transgender persons] are more likely to interact with police because they 
are more likely to be victims of violent crime, because they are more likely 
to be on the street due to homelessness and/or being unwelcome at home, 
because their circumstances often force them to work in the underground 
economy, and even because many face harassment and arrest simply 
because they are out in public while being transgender.146 
Kosilek’s case has received positive feedback from the LGBT 
community and extremely critical feedback from others.147  While this case 
is currently up on appeal, there is an online petition set in place by the family 
of Kosilek’s deceased wife, pleading for a reversal of the decision.148 Other 
forums have expressed support for the decision, which finally gives a voice 
to transgender prisoners.149 
A.  Impact on Future Litigation 
The controversial decision reached in Kosilek will have an impact on 
upcoming transgender prisoner litigation.  For example, in August 2013, 
Private Bradley Manning was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison for 
disclosing government secrets on the notorious website Wikileaks.150  While 
the Manning case received mass media attention due to the sensitive national 
security information spilled on Wikileaks, the Bradley Manning story took 
an unexpected turn when Bradley expressed his desire to live as a female.151  
After sentencing, Manning went on national television and said, “As I 
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transition into this next phase of my life, I want everyone to know the real 
me … I am Chelsea Manning.  I am a female.  Given the way that I feel, and 
have felt since childhood, I want to begin hormone therapy as soon as 
possible.”152  Although Manning’s situation is governed by military law, both 
Kosilek cases will likely play a huge role in the upcoming litigation as 
Manning seeks hormone therapy.   
In considering what will happen to Manning and other transgender 
prisoners, it is important to note the scope of the Kosilek holding is very 
limited.  What set Kosilek apart from previous transgender prisoner claims is 
that Kosilek was prescribed both hormone therapy and sex reassignment 
surgery by licensed DOC physicians.  In Manning’s case, a mere desire to 
have hormone therapy is not enough without a valid prescription from prison 
medical staff.  Such a prescription may not be easy to obtain.  Additionally, 
as other transgender prisoners try to use Kosilek as a means to receive 
hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery, they will likely hit the same 
roadblock.  The court’s narrow holding in Kosilek requires a prescription for 
hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery before an injunction may be 
ordered.153  
B.  The DOC’s Blatant Discrimination 
Additionally, the bizarre action on the part of the DOC in Kosilek II 
played a huge role in the outcome of the case.  The DOC’s freezing policy, 
coupled with the bad faith behavior of high-level DOC employees, made a 
big difference in Kosilek’s ability to prove the DOC had violated his rights 
and would continue to do so.  The DOC’s actions were so obviously 
discriminatory and so obviously directed at Kosilek, that the court simply 
could not ignore the DOC’s behavior.  As future litigation arises, the DOC 
may not be as blatantly discriminatory, which may shut the door for future 
claims. 
C.  Theories of Punishment  
In this case, the DOC was not able to show that significant security 
concerns arose due to Kosilek’s request for sex reassignment surgery.  Now 
that this decision has come down, DOC officials may learn how to better 
plead security issues in future litigation.  The DOC may find a loophole 
which indicates that deference should be given to security matters, such as 
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sexual violence by other prisoners in the facility,154 thus quashing 
transgender prisoner rights claims as they continue to arise. 
Furthermore, this case sheds light on the DOC’s harsh policies 
regarding transgender prisoners.  There are four theories of punishment 
accepted by criminal law scholars: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation.155  Retribution is punishment for its own sake, in that the 
offender deserves to be punished for his or her wrongful conduct.156  This 
provides justice for the victim, the victim’s family, and society as a whole.157  
The theory of deterrence is that punishment for one’s crimes will deter not 
only the criminal from committing future crimes, but will also deter others 
from committing that crime, for fear of incurring the same punishment.158  
Incapacitation is used to prevent crime from occurring, in that criminals 
cannot continue to harm society if they are locked up.159 Finally, 
rehabilitation is the theory that criminals in prison can engage in programs to 
help prisoners learn skills in order to become active, positive members of 
society.160  While rehabilitation efforts have previously been deemed 
unsuccessful, recent studies show rehabilitation programs reduce the risk of 
falling back into one’s old habits by about ten percent.161 
Retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation are all present in Kosilek’s 
case.  Kosilek is being punished for punishment’s sake so as to provide some 
means of justice for the victim’s family and society.  As other potential 
criminals see the life sentence imposed on Kosilek, they are likely deterred 
from making the same poor choices that Kosilek made.  Lastly, Kosilek is 
incapacitated, as he has lost his liberty and will remain behind prison walls 
until his death.  While these first three theories of punishment are established, 
the theory of rehabilitation is not as clear.  
According to the Massachusetts DOC, one of its primary goals is to 
“effect positive behavioral change in order to eliminate violence, 
victimization and recidivism.”162  This displays a clear intent to promote 
rehabilitation of prisoners within the DOC.  However, given the abhorrent 
behavior of DOC staff in Kosilek, it appears rehabilitation was never a goal 
for the care of Kosilek.  If the DOC, particularly Dennehy, took the necessary 
steps to help Kosilek overcome his mental illness, the DOC could have 
abided by its own mission statement to affect positive behavioral change in 
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Kosilek.  Rather, because of the DOC’s policies, Kosilek had to sit and suffer 
for years before any kind of intervention took place.  
Critics may assert that Kosilek will serve a life sentence, so why 
rehabilitate him?  Rehabilitation through education and counseling may be 
viewed as a human right, for rehabilitation is fundamental to human 
dignity.163  As a practical matter, rehabilitation efforts to provide inmates 
serving life sentences with opportunities to further their education and 
receive counseling have positive effects on the prison system and society as 
a whole.164  Scholars note that rehabilitation through education in the prison 
system is actually a means to lower costs.165  Robert Worth, a scholar on the 
prison system, asserts that, 
 Education may be the most effective way to lower prison costs [because] 
‘[educational] programs keep prisoners busy, with less supervision than 
you'd need otherwise.  Especially with respect to certain types of prison 
educational programs, you save money by hiring fewer officers in the short 
run and reducing recidivism in the long run.’166  
Additionally, rehabilitation is important for those serving life sentences 
because there are still judicial and legislative remedies.  Prisoners may still 
file habeas corpus claims, or there may be a subsequent change in the law.  
Those sentenced to life occasionally do return to society, and it is the duty of 
the prison system to ensure that they will be properly acclimated.   
Additionally appalling is that DOC officials specifically sought out 
former Vatican physicians to treat Kosilek and other transgender inmates.167 
While theories of punishment may include incarceration and retribution, the 
Eighth Amendment specifically prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.  
Bringing in Vatican trained officials, who are obviously against sex 
reassignment surgery, and for the most part, against social reform for the 
LBGT community in general, is a clear violation of Kosilek’s rights, which 
the court strongly considered in rendering its judgment.168  The DOC’s 
behavior in handling Kosilek’s medical issue goes against all of the theories 
of punishment because there is no societal interest at stake in creating policies 
and hiring physicians specifically aimed at denying Kosilek medical care.   
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D.  Taxpayer Dollars 
Finally, courts must consider whether sex reassignment surgery is a 
reasonable use of taxpayer dollars.  Given the Kosilek II holding, Kosilek is 
now entitled to receive sex reassignment surgery, which will indeed be 
funded by state tax dollars.169  The cost of sex reassignment surgery for one 
person is anywhere from $12,000 to $30,000.170  Hormone therapy, which is 
also paid by taxpayer dollars,171 costs about $200 per month per prisoner.172  
However, as of 1995, the National Association of Attorneys General 
indicated that inmate civil rights litigation costs the United States upwards of 
eighty-one million dollars every year.173 
Some people and politicians may argue that it is not fair for a 
transgender prisoner to receive sex reassignment surgery while incarcerated, 
while those of us with our liberty still intact would have to pay for it 
ourselves.  Even as we move towards universal health care, sex reassignment 
surgery is likely not covered by either the Affordable Care Act or most 
normal coverage insurance carriers.174  However, in a case as serious as 
Kosilek’s, where his life and wellbeing are at stake, it is more responsible 
financially to take care of his medical needs rather than to continue litigation.   
In an article about Kosilek specifically, Zack Ford noted that, 
“Ironically, the state has spent more than double fighting [Kosilek’s] lawsuit 
than what her surgery would have cost in the first place.”175 Jeff Krehely, 
Vice President for the LGBT Research and Communications Project, asserts 
that providing transgender prisoners with appropriate medical care is the 
fiscally responsible response.176  Massachusetts has spent over ten years 
litigating claims regarding the medical care of Kosilek.177  In 2008, USA 
Today reported that Massachusetts spent at least $52,000 on medical expert 
testimony.178  This cost alone is at least twice as much as sex reassignment 
surgery would have been in the first place.   
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United States District Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf, who decided both 
Kosilek I and Kosilek II, will award over $700,000 in legal fees to the 
attorneys of Kosilek.179  Attorneys for Kosilek indicated that they would drop 
the request if the DOC would simply comply with the court ordered 
injunction, rather than continue to litigate Kosilek II through the appeal 
process.180 According to Judge Wolf, “The repeated violation of 
constitutional rights of prisoners. . . costs taxpayers money that is needed for 
other purposes.”181 Given sex reassignment surgery costs between $7,000 
and $50,000,182 the fiscally savvy choice seems apparent.   Such funds could 
be much better used in another government program or even as a means to 
lower tax rates.  Given the narrow criteria transgender prisoners need to attain 
sex reassignment surgery, taxpayer dollars are much better spent in providing 
for their requested and needed medical care than to continue endless, 
expensive litigation.  As litigation relating to Kosilek continues to this day, 
the State continues to cash out more and more taxpayer dollars for a problem 
that could have been solved long ago. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. District Court properly ordered an injunction requiring sex 
reassignment surgery for Kosilek.  Given the specific facts and abhorrent 
policies of the DOC in this case, the district court made the correct decision 
in providing Kosilek with much needed medical care for his severe GID.  
This holding was extremely narrow, and, therefore, will likely not open the 
floodgates for future litigation.  However, Kosilek II will be heavily relied 
upon as transgender prisoners seek sex reassignment surgery in the future.  
Further, it is clear from the case that the DOC did not abide by its own policy 
of rehabilitation.  Hopefully, the DOC, both in Massachusetts and elsewhere, 
will learn from its now criticized policies and change its standards.  Finally, 
given statistical data, it is clear that sex reassignment surgery is not an 
unreasonable use of taxpayer dollars, given the enormous costs of litigating 
cases such as Kosilek I and II.  In evaluating this case from an objective, yet 
humane, point of view, it is clear that Kosilek has a significant medical need, 
and fortunately, the court set politics aside and addressed that issue 
appropriately.  While this is a polarizing issue, many people lose sight of the 
fact that although these men and women are incarcerated for serious crimes, 
they are still people, just like the rest of us.  Everyone has a right to receive 
medical care and to be free from cruel punishments, even the criminally 
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convicted.  In a system where transgendered prisoners are often overlooked, 
the Kosilek cases show that our courts are making an effort to ensure that all 
prisoners are equal.   
 
 
 
